The tipping point: a mathematical model for the profit-driven
  abandonment of restaurant tipping by Clifton, Sara M. et al.
The tipping point: a mathematical model for the profit-driven
abandonment of restaurant tipping
Sara M. Clifton∗
Department of Mathematics, University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL 61801, USA
Eileen Herbers and Jack Chen
Department of Engineering Sciences and Applied Mathematics,
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA
Daniel M. Abrams
Department of Engineering Sciences and Applied Mathematics,
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA
Northwestern Institute for Complex Systems,
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA and
Department of Physics and Astronomy,
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA
(Dated: December 18, 2017)
Abstract
The custom of voluntarily tipping for services rendered has gone in and out of fashion in Amer-
ica since its introduction in the 19th century. Restaurant owners that ban tipping in their estab-
lishments often claim that social justice drives their decisions, but we show that rational profit-
maximization may also justify the decisions. Here, we propose a conceptual model of restaurant
competition for staff and customers, and we show that there exists a critical conventional tip rate
at which restaurant owners should eliminate tipping to maximize profit. Because the conventional
tip rate has been increasing steadily for the last several decades, our model suggests that restaurant
owners may abandon tipping en masse when that critical tip rate is reached.
∗ E-mail me at: smc567@illinois.edu
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tipping for restaurant service has gone in and out of fashion in America since its in-
troduction from Europe in the 19th century [1]. Tipping has always been a controversial
social convention, for both scholars and the public. The practice has been consistently tied
to the worst of human nature: racism, sexism, and classism [2–5]. At many points in time,
tipping has been considered downright anti-democratic [6]. Yet the practice persists because
the vast majority of Americans prefer to choose how much gratuity they leave after a meal
[7, 8].
Economists have traditionally struggled to explain the practice of tipping in terms of
rational costs and benefits because a rational economic agent would not incur a monetary
cost that provides no present or future benefit [9]. Sociologists and psychologists have
appealed to negative feelings of guilt, embarrassment, or anxiety to explain why people
conform to the social convention of tipping [10–12], while others have appealed to altruistic
feelings of generosity and empathy [13–15].
While much scholarly attention has been paid to the consumers who tip and employees
who receive tips (e.g. [16–19]), relatively little has been paid to restaurant owners who
employ tipped staff. Theoretical models of tipping often see restaurant owners as inefficient
judges of service quality [20]. The natural conclusion to this rationale is that restaurant
owners should allow tips in their restaurants in order to efficiently evaluate the quality of
their wait staff [21]. This conclusion breaks down when we consider the real-world factors
that influence restaurant owners’ decisions, such as remaining profitable while also adhering
to minimum wage restrictions, retaining talented staff, and meeting customer expectations
for food and service quality [22]. By accounting for these factors and appealing only to
rational profit-maximization motivations, we show that restaurants owners should play a
more active role in determining tip rates in their restaurants.
As the conventional tip rate gradually increases in the US (see Fig 1), waiters’ take home
pay steadily increases, while back-of-house employees’ pay remains stagnant [23]. Despite the
low federal minimum wage for tipped workers ($2.13 as of 2017 [24]), waiters consistently
earn more than cooks [25]. As the wage disparity increases, talented cooks may defect
to restaurants where profits are shared more equitably among staff, and talented waiters
may defect to restaurants with higher tips. A rational restaurant owner interested only in
maximizing profit might take control of the tip rate in his/her restaurant in order to retain
the most talented front-of-house (tipped) and back-of-house (untipped) staff. We show in a
conceptual model of two competing restaurants that a critical tipping rate exists at which
a rational restaurant owner will abandon tipping to maximize profit.
II. METHODS
A. Model derivation
As a simple conceptual model, consider two restaurants competing for diners, waiters,
and cooks. For notational ease, we will focus on one restaurant (our restaurant, Restaurant
1). We assume all diners, waiters, and cooks intend to eat or work, respectively, at either
our restaurant or the competing restaurant. Following a dynamical systems approach by
Abrams et al. for modeling generic social group competition [27], people will transition
between restaurants at a rate proportional to the relative utility of being at each restaurant
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FIG. 1. Average reported tip rate in American restaurants over time, according to NPD Group
(1982-84) and Zagat annual surveys (1989-present) [26]. Note that both surveys are aimed at diners
who patronize full-service midscale and upscale restaurants.
(either as a customer or an employee). This general model assumes that the popularity of
a social group also influences the transition rates, but for our purpose of modeling purely
rational behavior, we focus only on utility as a driving force. Our simplification reduces the
model by Abrams et al. to
dx
dt
= y Pyx(ux)− xPxy(ux), (1)
where x is the fraction of people in group X, Pyx is the probability per unit time of tran-
sitioning from group Y to group X, ux is the utility of group X, and transition rates are
symmetric under exchange of x and y. In our case, X is our restaurant and Y is the com-
peting restaurant. Alternatively, the “competing restaurant” could be viewed as a reservoir
of all other dining options (including home), but that extension is left for future work.
1. Dynamics of cooks
Suppose our system has a number NC of cooks who must choose between our restau-
rant and the competing restaurant. Many factors influence a cook’s decision to work at a
particular restaurant, but we model cooks primarily concerned with pay. Because cooks do
not receive tips, cooks choose where to work based only on the relative wage at the two
restaurants. Assuming for simplicity that the transition probabilities are linear in relative
base cook pay, the change in the number of cooks C˜ at our restaurant is
τC
dC˜
dt
= (NC − C˜) bC1
bC1 + bC2︸ ︷︷ ︸
switch from
competitor to us
− C˜ bC2
bC1 + bC2︸ ︷︷ ︸
switch from
us to competitor
, (2)
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where τC sets the transition time scale for cooks, and bC1 and bC2 are the hourly base cook
pay at our restaurant and the other restaurant, respectively. For example, if both restaurants
offer the same base pay (bC1 = bC2), then eventually half the cooks will be at our restaurant,
and the other half will go to the competitor. Tilde notation will be removed later when the
model is normalized.
2. Dynamics of waiters
Like the cooks, the waiters in our system are primarily concerned with pay. Because
waiters receive both hourly wages and gratuity, the transition rate between restaurants
depends on the relative hourly take home (total) pay at the two restaurants. The hourly
gratuity at our restaurant is
g1 =
m1D˜T1
W˜
, (3)
where m1 is the hourly menu price, D˜ is the number of diners, T1 is the tip rate, and W˜
is the number of waiters that must split the total tips. The gratuity g2 at the competing
restaurant is similarly defined.
The hourly take home pay at our restaurant is then bW1 + g1, where bW1 is the hourly
base waiter pay at our restaurant. The change in the number of waiters W˜ at our restaurant
is then
τW
dW˜
dt
= (NW − W˜ ) bW1 + g1
bW1 + g1 + bW2 + g2︸ ︷︷ ︸
switch from
competitor to us
− W˜ bW2 + g2
bW1 + g1 + bW2 + g2︸ ︷︷ ︸
switch from
us to competitor
, (4)
where τW sets the transition time scale for waiters, and NW is the number of waiters in the
system.
3. Dynamics of diners
Assuming all diners intend to eat at a restaurant, they must chose between our restaurant
and our competitor. Many factors influence a person’s decision to eat at a particular restau-
rant, but we will focus on food and service quality versus menu cost. There are also many
ways to measure food and service quality [28–30], but we will use the number of cooks and
waiters who choose to work at our restaurant as a basic proxy. For instance, if our restaurant
attracts more waiters, then diners will receive more personal attention and perceived service
quality will increase. Suppose for simplicity that the quality q1 of the meal and service at
our restaurant is a linear combination of the number of cooks C˜ and waiters W˜ working at
our restaurant:
q1 = αW W˜ + αCC˜, (5)
where αW and αC are the weights placed on service and food, respectively, when evaluating
our restaurant. The quality q2 of the competing restaurant is defined similarly. Note that
this proxy for restaurant quality will only be an acceptable approximation if both restaurants
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are not grossly over- or under-staffed. We explore two alternative formulations for restaurant
quality in the supplementary online material, and we find similar qualitative results.
We define the value v1 of our restaurant as the quality q1 over the menu cost (including
tips):
v1 =
αW W˜ + αCC˜
m1(1 + T1)
, (6)
where m1 is the hourly menu cost and T1 is the tip rate at our restaurant. The value v2 of
the other restaurant is defined similarly.
A rational diner chooses a restaurant based on the perceived relative value of each restau-
rant. The change in the number of diners D˜ at our restaurant is then
τD
dD˜
dt
= (ND − D˜) v1
v1 + v2︸ ︷︷ ︸
switch from
competitor to us
− D˜ v2
v1 + v2︸ ︷︷ ︸
switch from
us to competitor
, (7)
where τD sets the transition time scale for diners, and ND is the number of diners in the
system.
4. Profitability
Given the flow of employees and customers to and from our restaurant, a rational restau-
rant owner will maximize hourly profit
P˜ = m1 D˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue
− bW1 W˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
waiter pay
− bC1 C˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
cook pay
. (8)
We ignore fixed costs because we are only concerned with maximizing profitability, not
absolute profits.
B. Normalized model
We now normalize and nondimensionalize the system (2)-(7) to reduce the number of
parameters. We make the following substitutions
D =
D˜
ND
, W =
W˜
NW
, C =
C˜
NC
(9)
r =
αC
αW
, rDW =
ND
NW
, rCW =
NC
NW
, (10)
so that D, W , and C are the fraction diners, waiters and cooks at our restaurant, r is
the ratio of food to service importance for customers, and rDW and rCW are the ratios of
diners and cooks to waiters, respectively. We also rescale time such that τC = τW = τD = 1.
Naturally, the transition rates may vary for diners, waiters, and cooks; customers may switch
dining locations more rapidly than employees switch jobs. However, we are only interested
in equilibrium states, so we ignore this detail.
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Then the fraction of diners at our restaurant follows the dynamics
dD
dt
= (1−D) v1
v1 + v2
−D v2
v1 + v2
(11)
v1 =
W + r rCW C
m1(1 + T1)
, v2 =
(1−W ) + r rCW (1− C)
m2(1 + T2)
. (12)
The fraction of waiters at our restaurant follows the dynamics
dW
dt
= (1−W ) bW1 + g1
bW1 + g1 + bW2 + g2
−W bW2 + g2
bW1 + g1 + bW2 + g2
(13)
g1 =
m1rDWDT1
W
, g2 =
m2rDW (1−D)T2
W
. (14)
Finally, the fraction of cooks at our restaurant follows the dynamics
dC
dt
= (1− C) bC1
bC1 + bC2
− C bC2
bC1 + bC2
. (15)
All variables and parameters are described in Table I.
Variable Meaning Units Range Baseline
D fraction of diners at our restaurant – [0, 1] –
W fraction of waiters at our restaurant – [0, 1] –
C fraction of cooks at our restaurant – [0, 1] –
t time (dimensionless) – [0, ∞) –
r relative importance of food quality versus service quality,
typically a value exceeding one
– [4, 20] 12§
rCW ratio of total cooks to waiters in the system – [0.5, 2] 1
rDW ratio of total diners to waiters in the system – [1, 20] 12
m1 average menu cost per hour at our restaurant $/hr [5, 20] 10
bW1 waiters’ base pay per hour at our restaurant $/hr [2.13*, 25] 5.00†
bC1 cooks’ base pay per hour at our restaurant $/hr [7.25*, 25] 10.40†
T1 average tip rate at our restaurant, determined by either
social convention or mandated by restaurant owner
– [0.01, 0.5] 0.19‡
v1 meal value perceived by customers at our restaurant 1/$ – –
g1 gratuity per hour at our restaurant $/hr – –
TABLE I. Description of model variables and parameters for our restaurant, Restaurant 1. The
competing restaurant (Restaurant 2) has similarly defined parameter values subscripted with 2.
We present a range of plausible values for each parameter and a baseline value for midscale and
upscale restaurants like those reviewed by Zagat. (§ crude estimate based on customer surveys
[28]; *federal minimum wage as of 2017 [24]; †average waiter and cook pay as of 2015 [31]; ‡average
self-reported tip rate as of 2016 [26]; other baseline values are guesses based on author experience).
With this change of variables, hourly profit P˜ becomes the hourly profit per waiter in
the system
P = m1 rDW D − bW1W − bC1 rCW C. (16)
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III. RESULTS
A. Numerical exploration
Numerical integration suggests that one stable steady state solution exists for each set of
parameters regardless of the initial condition, so long as the initial condition is physically
meaningful. Because cooks only switch restaurants in response to base pay (constant pa-
rameter), the distribution of cooks equilibrates first. Diners and waiters respond to everyone
else in the system, so the distribution of diners and waiters equilibrates later.
For otherwise identical restaurants, small changes in restaurant policy (like staff pay,
menu prices, and tip rates) will have an effect on the entire restaurant ecosystem. Lowering
the tip rate at our restaurant will cause waiters will leave our restaurant because they get
paid less, but diners will prefer our restaurant because they pay less (see Fig 2a).
If the menu price at our restaurant is lower than the competitor, then diners will flock
to our restaurant because they pay less, and waiters will temporarily leave our restaurant
because lower menu prices lead to lower tips. However, after our restaurant has a large share
of diners, waiters return because the density of diners balances the lower menu prices (see
Fig 2b).
If we pay our cooks less than our competitor, then cooks will leave our restaurant because
they get paid less; as food quality decreases, diners will leave our restaurant, and then waiters
will leave our restaurant as their hourly tips decrease (see Fig 2c).
As a final example, if we pay our cooks more but pay our waiters less to compensate,
cooks will flock to our restaurant followed by diners; waiters will temporarily leave because
they are paid lower wages, but eventually they will come back as diners flood our restaurant
(see Fig 2d).
B. Equilibrium stability analysis
Fixed point analysis shows that four steady states exist. Only one fixed point is mean-
ingful (i.e., D∗,W ∗, C∗ ∈ [0, 1]). The steady state for cooks is C∗ = bC1/(bC1 + bC2). The
steady states for waiters and diners have closed forms but are too long to include. For all
reasonable parameter values (listed in Table I), the eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated at
the fixed point are real and negative. This implies that the equilibrium is a stable sink. See
Fig S5.
C. Equilibrium sensitivity analysis
Global sensitivity and uncertainty analysis using Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) of
parameter space and Partial Rank Correlation Coefficients (PRCC) [32] reveal that equilib-
rium distributions of diners and waiters depend significantly (p < 0.001) on tip rates and
cook pay. Equilibrium distributions of waiters also depend significantly on waiter pay. Note
that the parameters that significantly influence these distributions describe the differences
between restaurants and do not describe the system as a whole. See Fig S6.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Numerical simulation of system (11)-(15) with two nearly identical compet-
ing restaurants. (a) If the tip rate at our restaurant is lower than the competitor, then waiters will
leave, but diners will prefer our restaurant (T2 = 0.25). (b) If the menu price at our restaurant
is lower than the competitor, then diners will flock to our restaurant, and waiters will temporarily
leave. However, after our restaurant has a large share of diners, waiters will return (m2 = 15). (c)
If we pay our cooks less, then cooks followed by diners followed by waiters will leave (bc2 = 12). (d)
If we pay our cooks more but pay our waiters less to compensate, cooks will flock to our restaurant
followed by diners; waiters will temporarily leave because they are paid lower wages, but eventually
they will come back as diners flood our restaurant (bw2 = 10, bc1 = 15). Unless otherwise noted,
m1 = m2 = 10, T1 = T2 = 0.2, bw1 = bw2 = 5, bc1 = bc2 = 10, r = 12.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Tip abandonment threshold
Suppose our restaurant is attempting to maximize hourly profit (16) at equilibrium. We
assume our restaurant is competing with a typical American restaurant that is not making
dynamic changes to staff pay, menu prices, or tipping policies. Given the choices the other
restaurant has made, our restaurant can choose base pay for cooks and waiters (within legal
limits) and a gratuity policy. Both restaurants maintain identical menu prices to ensure the
restaurants are true competitors; fine dining establishments do not typically compete with
casual restaurants.
If the competing restaurant allows the conventional tipping rate, then there exists a
critical tip rate threshold Tc at which a rational restaurant owner would forbid tipping to
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maximize profit. Fig 3a shows the conventional tip rate at which a hypothetical restaurant
should switch from allowing the conventional tip to abandoning tipping in their establish-
ment. Though the critical tip rate depends on the entire restaurant ecosystem, numerical
exploration indicates that the trade off between meal cost and restaurant quality, as per-
ceived by diners, is the primary driver of the critical tip rate (see Fig 3b-f). Assuming
the conventional tip rate continues to increase in the US, we predict that restaurants will
eventually forbid tipping when it become more profitable to do so.
Global sensitivity and uncertainty analysis shows that this critical tipping threshold de-
pends significantly on the menu price shared by both restaurants, the ratio of customers to
waiters and cooks to waiters, and the ratio of food quality to service quality in the eyes of the
customer (see Fig 4). Note that the parameters that significantly influence the critical tip
rate Tc describe the type or “class” of restaurant system we are considering. For instance,
fine dining restaurants maintain a low diner to waiter ratio rDW and high menu prices m.
It is also likely that diners at fine dining establishments place more value on service than at
casual restaurants, decreasing r.
Local sensitivity analysis about ‘typical’ American restaurant parameters suggests that
increased menu price, increased service importance, increased diner-to-waiter ratio, and
increased waiter-to-cook ratio all increase the critical tipping rate (see Fig 5). Because
no type or class of restaurant increases all these parameters, we cannot say with certainty
that a certain type of restaurant should abandon tipping before another. However, the
three strongest correlated parameters (r, rCW ,m) support the prediction that casual dining
restaurants should be the first to abandon tipping, and fine dining establishments should be
the last to abandon tipping.
This prediction is consistent with tipping practices in the most casual restaurants: cus-
tomers in fast food restaurants and counter-service establishments are not typically expected
to leave tips. Among restaurants that expect patrons to leave tips, the prediction is surpris-
ing because the most vocal advocates for eliminating tipping in America have been owners
of upscale restaurants. However, fine dining restaurant owners cite social justice as the pri-
mary motive for eliminating tipping in their establishments [33]. This claim is consistent
with our prediction because many restauranteurs have been forced to reinstate tipping in
their restaurants in order to remain profitable [34].
B. Limitations
As a conceptual model, system (11)-(15) cannot offer quantitative predictions with con-
fidence. One limitation of this model is the lack of competition among many restaurants or
eating at home, though this could be addressed by considering the “competing restaurant”
as a pool of competition. Additionally, the model assumes that the benefit of more employ-
ees does not have diminishing returns. More realistically, restaurant food or service will only
benefit from more employees up to a certain point; after the restaurant is fully staffed, more
employees will be a waste of money and may even impede service.
Our model also ignores both the federal law that requires restaurant owners to supplement
tipped worker wages if their hourly tips do not exceed the federal minimum wage [35] and
many state laws that impose larger minimum wages for tipped employees [24]. We also do not
provide a mechanism by which the conventional tip rate increases and merely assume that
the increasing trend will continue; however, the increasing trend is supported by theoretical
economic models [9]. Finally and most importantly, this model assumes that humans behave
9
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Example of critical tip rate threshold. (a) For conventional tip rates below
some critical threshold Tc, a rational restaurant owner would allow diners to leave gratuity to max-
imize profitability (black curve). Beyond that critical threshold, a rational restaurant owner would
disallow tipping in their restaurant (red dashed curve). Both curves assume that the restaurant
owner selects staff pay (within legal limits) to maximize profit. For this hypothetical restaurant
ecosystem, (b) both optimal cook pay and (c) total waiter pay (optimal wage plus tips) drop if we
eliminate tipping. Though staff leave our restaurant in response to a no-tip policy, (d) the drop
in perceived quality balances (e) the effective menu price (menu cost plus tips) near the critical
tip rate. (f) The trade off between quality and price, as perceived by diners, drives the critical
tip rate. For this example, m1 = m2 = 10, r = 4, bW2 = 10, bC2 = 25, rDW = 10, rCW = 1, the
minimum wage for tipped workers is 2.13, and the minimum wage for untipped workers is 7.25.
rationally when spending or earning money, a false assumption common among economic
models [36]. Restaurant owners may choose to abandon or maintain tipping regardless of
profit, citing economically irrational reasons or responding to irrational customer feelings.
In spite of these limitations, the qualitative prediction that a critical tipping threshold
exists at which restaurant owners may abandon tipping is supported by previous trends
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FIG. 4. Global sensitivity and uncertainty analysis for tipping threshold Tc. The Partial Rank
Correlation Coefficient (PRCC) between model parameters and the tipping threshold Tc are show.
Asterisks indicate that the correlation is significant (***p < 0.001, N = 100 samples). Note that
we use PRCC because numerical tests suggest that the relationship between parameters and Tc is
monotonic.
both in America and internationally. Tipping has gone in and out of fashion around the
world, and though customers normally drive the introduction (or reintroduction) of the
trend, restaurant owners or governments typically end the practice [37].
V. CONCLUSION
The conceptual model presented here takes a new direction towards understanding the
complex service industry. The oscillating popularity of tipping has previously been at-
tributed to social contagion and irrational responses to classism. Using a new approach
to modeling the social convention of tipping, we show that rational decisions to maximize
profit may drive the cycle of the tipping trend. We predict that there exists a critical tip
rate threshold at which restaurant owners would be wise to eliminate tipping in their estab-
lishments. Furthermore, we expect that casual restaurants should be the first to abandon
tipping, and fine dining restaurants should be the last.
The simplicity of the model does not allow for quantitative predictions, such as when
tipping will go out of fashion in the US or what the threshold tip rate will be. However,
the model serves as a base for more sophisticated models and could direct economic data
collection to better answer quantitative questions. This effort would be important not only
to restaurant owners, but also to economists, sociologists, policy makers, and all people who
play a role in or interact with the service industry.
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FIG. 5. Local sensitivity analysis for tipping threshold Tc. (a) Holding all else constant, higher
menu price implies a larger tip threshold. This indicates that fine dining restaurants should be the
last the abandon tipping if all other parameters are the same. (b) As diners place more relative
importance on food than service, the critical tip rate decreases. Because customers at fine dining
establishments likely place more value on service, we again expect that fine dining restaurants
will be the last to abandon tipping. (c) In contrast, as the ratio of diners to waiters increases,
the critical tipping rate increases. All else held constant, this would imply that casual dining
establishments would drop tipping last. (d) As the ratio of cooks to waiters increases, the critical
tip rate decreases. Though it is difficult to know this ratio for full service restaurants, it makes
sense that the large cook-to-waiter ratio seen at counter service restaurants implies little to no
tipping. For this example, m1 = m2 = 10, r = 12, bW2 = 5, bC2 = 10, rDW = 12, rCW = 0.5, unless
otherwise noted on the independent axis.
VI. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
See supplementary material for additional discussion and figures.
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S1. OPTIMAL WAITER BASE PAY
The profit optimization algorithm selects the most profitable staff pay rate for every tip
rate scenario, so restaurant owners that abandon tipping must pay waiters a higher wage
to compensate for the lost tips. Fig S1 shows that the relative optimal base pay when we
forbid tipping must steadily increase as the tip rate increases.
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FIG. S1. Illustration of optimal waiter base pay under different tipping protocols. When our
restaurant chooses to forbid tipping, the optimal waiter base pay rate increases steadily with the
conventional tip rate. In other words, restaurant owners must compensate for lost tips. For this
example, m1 = m2 = 10, r = 4, bW2 = 10, bC2 = 25, rDW = 10, rCW = 1, the minimum wage for
tipped workers is 2.13, and the minimum wage for untipped workers is 7.25. Note that the base pay
ratio is low when tipping is allowed because waiters at the other restaurant are paid $10 an hour
no matter what, and the optimization algorithm tells us to pay waiters minimum wage ($2.13).
As the tip rate increases, waiters receive relatively more compensation from tips than
from base pay (see Fig S1). This is expected, though it is difficult to know if our ratios are
realistic because tips, often paid in cash, may be under-reported.
S2. ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF RESTAURANT QUALITY
Though we have framed the model as counting the literal number of waiters and cooks
in the restaurant, the model could be reinterpreted as measuring the total waiter and cook
quality. Because the number of cooks and waiters in our restaurant is actually the number
who wish to work in our restaurant, one could argue that W and C are indicators of the
quality of staff we’ll have when we hire the appropriate number of waiters and cooks.
Without any adjustment to the model, C could be interpreted as the fraction of cooks
who wish to work in our restaurant, and bC1C (total pay for all cooks) could be the quality
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FIG. S2. Illustration of base pay as a fraction of total pay under different tipping protocols. When
our restaurant allows tipping, less and less waiter pay comes from wages as the conventional tip
rate increases. For this example, m1 = m2 = 10, r = 4, bW2 = 10, bC2 = 25, rDW = 10, rCW = 1,
the minimum wage for tipped workers is 2.13, and the minimum wage for untipped workers is 7.25.
of the cooks actually hired. We simply assume that we hire the best cooks from the pool
of applicants and pay them appropriately. For instance, if ten cooks want to work at our
restaurant, then we could hire all ten at $10 an hour. Equivalently, we could hire only the
most qualified five cooks and pay them $20 an hour.
We can apply the same logic to waiters, but the model will need to be adjusted slightly.
As is, gratuities are split among all waiters, and a new model would need to account for the
actual number of waiters working in the restaurant. For instance, if we hire half as many
waiters that are twice as talented and pay them twice the salary, our profit function would
not change. However, each waiter would receive double the tips because the gratuities would
be split among half as many waiters.
S3. ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS FOR RESTAURANT QUALITY
The most difficult modeling task for this restaurant ecosystem is formulating a simple, but
realistic, restaurant quality measure. The original model uses the weighted sum of waiters
and cooks at our restaurant as a proxy for restaurant quality. Alternatively, a weighted sum
of waiter and cook pay could be a proxy for restaurant quality:
q1 = αW (bW1 + g1) + αCbC1 (17)
With this new definition of restaurant quality, the critical tip threshold remains (see Fig
S3).
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FIG. S3. Example of critical tip rate threshold with pay-dependent quality measure (17). For
conventional tip rates below some critical threshold (blue dashed line), a rational restaurant owner
would allow diners to leave gratuity to maximize profitability (black curve). Beyond that critical
threshold, a rational restaurant owner would disallow tipping in their restaurant (red dashed curve).
Both curves assume that the restaurant owner selects staff pay (within legal limits) to maximize
profit. For this example, m1 = m2 = 10, r = 2, bW2 = 10, bC2 = 25, rDW = 10, rCW = 1, the
minimum wage for tipped workers is 2.13, and the minimum wage for untipped workers is 7.25.
Another alternative proxy for restaurant quality could depend on the product of staff pay
and number of staff:
q1 = αW W˜ (bW1 + g1) + αCC˜bC1 (18)
With this new definition of restaurant quality, the critical tip threshold again remains (see
Fig S4). This suggests that the qualitative prediction that a critical tip rate exists is robust
to the exact model formulation for restaurant quality.
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FIG. S4. Example of critical tip rate threshold with pay- and staff-dependent quality measure (18).
For conventional tip rates below some critical threshold (blue dashed line), a rational restaurant
owner would allow diners to leave gratuity to maximize profitability (black curve). Beyond that
critical threshold, a rational restaurant owner would disallow tipping in their restaurant (red dashed
curve). Both curves assume that the restaurant owner selects staff pay (within legal limits) to
maximize profit. For this example, m1 = m2 = 10, r = 4, bW2 = 10, bC2 = 25, rDW = 10, rCW = 1,
the minimum wage for tipped workers is 2.13, and the minimum wage for untipped workers is 7.25.
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S4. ADDITIONAL FIGURES
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FIG. S5. Phase portrait of two identical restaurants with differing tip rates. Our restaurant
(shown) enforces an automatic gratuity of T1 = 0.15, and the competing restaurant allows the
conventional tip rate of T2 = 0.2. The steady state is (D
∗,W ∗, C∗) = (0.51, 0.49, 0.50). Nullclines
dD/dt = 0 (blue) and dW/dt = 0 (red) are superimposed. For this example, m1 = m2 = 10, r =
12, bW1 = bW2 = 5, bC1 = bC2 = 10, rDW = 1, rCW = 1.
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FIG. S6. Global sensitivity and uncertainty analysis for equilibrium state. (a) Partial Rank Corre-
lation Coefficient (PRCC) between model parameters and diner equilibrium. (b) PRCC between
model parameters and waiter equilibrium. Asterisks indicate that the correlation is significant
(***p < 0.001, N = 100 samples). Note that we use PRCC because numerical tests suggest that
the relationships between parameters and equilibria are monotonic.
20
